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Abstract
Private information about securitised debt as well as complex transaction structures could possibly impair the
fair market valuation. In a simple issue design model without intermediaries we maximise issuer proceeds
over a positive measure of issue quality, we derive an optimal allocation schedule for maximum issuer payoffs
for endogenous price discovery under different pricing regimes if asymmetric information requires
underpricing. In particular, we study how the incidence of uninformed investors at varying levels of valuation
uncertainty and their function of clearing the market effects profitable informed investment. We find that the
issuer optimises own payoffs at each valuation irrespective of the applicable pricing mechanism by awarding
informed investors the lowest possible allocation (and attendant underpricing) that still guarantees profitable
informed investment. Under uniform pricing the composition of the investor pool ensures that informed
investors appropriate higher profit than uninformed types. Any reservation utility by issuers lowers the
probability of information disclosure by informed investors and the scope of issuers to curtail profitable
informed investment.3
I.  INTRODUCTION
Asset securitisation refers to the growing tendency of substituting capital markets for intermediaries in
channelling external funds to efficient uses of economic activity. Recently it has been touted as a viable and
expedient risk management and refinancing method. It allows issuers to convert existing or future cash flows
from pooled asset exposures (“reference portfolio”) into marketable debt securities as commoditised
structured claims, which blend default risk and asset pricing features of securitised assets (mostly mortgages,
consumer debt, trade receivables and corporate loans) and the merchantability of fixed income securities.
Secured debt, such as asset-backed securities (ABS), registers as a safer claim than unsecured debt under the
pecking order theory (Myers, 1977; Leland, 1998), mainly because it derives its value from repayment on a
scrutinisable asset portfolio insulated from overall issuer performance. At the same time, the inherent asset
transformation of securitisation challenges the traditional value proposition of financial intermediation by
separating asset origination and risk management as two distinctive components in external finance. Despite
its efficiency-enhancing effect as a diversified source of liquid funds, securitisation falls short of mitigating
incomplete capital allocation in financial markets. The complex nature of securitisation engenders valuation
uncertainty and possible non-verifiability of trading motives due to imperfect information dissemination.
Asymmetric information between issuers and investors suggests that issuers have superior information about
the true asset value, so that investors in securitised assets would reasonably command external price
discounting to compensate for ex ante moral hazard as regards the deliberate misrepresentation of securitised
asset quality and adverse selection by rational investor expectations à la Akerlof (1970).1 Issuers usually retain
                                                
1 Rational investors would expect to be offered only poor deals in securitisation markets under asymmetric information.
If the investment choice is conditional on the level of investor information, uninformed investors assume to partake in a
disproportionately large number of poor transactions once better informed investors have picked off most if not all
profitable deals. Asymmetric information might also arise from (i) incentives of biased loan selection at the time the
asset composition of the portfolio is determined (ex ante moral hazard) and (ii) reduced monitoring of asset exposure
after securitisation (ex post moral hazard). See Jobst (2003) for a detailed review of the information economics of asset
securitisation.4
the most junior claim in a transaction (credit enhancement) as ex ante reservation utility to mitigate these agency
costs of asymmetric information (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1997).
In this chapter, we present a general issue design, which demonstrates how valuation uncertainty and credit
enhancement might affect both the incentive structure of investors and issuer payoff of security issuance. A
low incidence of informed investors suggests an auction-style allocation mechanism with price discounting
(“underpricing”) as a feasible model design for the optimal choice of pricing and allocation under valuation
uncertainty. Our proposed model introduces a new argument for optimal security issuance under asymmetric
information without intermediaries in keeping with the “winner’s curse” problem. Although our framework
of optimal security issuance relies on the conventional allocation-based argument of IPO underpricing due to
asymmetric information between issuers and investors in keeping with the “winner’s curse” problem (Rock,
1986), our simple one-period approach goes beyond the rationing of uninformed investors as the main
determinant of underpricing. In a general auction-style design, we maximise issuer payoffs conditional on
price discounting needed to guarantee profitable informed investment over a positive measure of issue quality
for a given degree of valuation uncertainty about securitised assets. As opposed to Rock (1986), where
underpricing compensates uninformed investors for being rationed by informed demand across all states of
profitable investment, we explain underpricing to be jointly determined by both an auction-style share
allocation to informed investors and the degree of uninformed investment associated with valuation
uncertainty. It is not the rationing of uninformed investors, but the allocation preference by informed
investors, which guides our thinking about underpricing and how it relates to the optimisation problem of
issuer proceeds. We treat the level of allocation as a strategic choice variable, which allows issuers to extract
information about the actual quality of the security issue through revealed allocation preference by informed
investors in a direct revelation mechanism (DRM).2 DRM endogenises price discovery in an auction-style
allocation preference as a continuous function of perceived issue quality. Informed investors accept some
allocation as a continuous function of their beliefs about the actual issue valuation and reveal their valuation5
to uninformed investors only if a known price-quantity schedule implies profitable investment.3 The
acceptance set of profitable informed investment qualifies an optimal allocation schedule for maximum issuer
payoffs at varying degrees of valuation uncertainty and different pricing regimes. Issuers maximise issue
payoffs at a positive measure of issue quality for an allocation that ensures participation by informed
investors. The price discovery of actual issue quality conditional on some acceptance set of informed
investors allows issuers to price the residual allocation to uninformed investors to clear the market. In
particular, we study how the incidence of uninformed investors at varying levels of valuation uncertainty
affects the utility from informed investment if the offering price is set to be either the same for both types of
investors (uniform pricing) or higher for uninformed investors (discriminatory pricing). The residual
allocation to uninformed investors and the incentive of informed investors to subscribe to DRM at any issue
quality – as long as some allocation yields positive payoff – curtail the ability of informed investors to
optimise own payoffs from disclosing their beliefs under the profitability condition of DRM. Under uniform
pricing, the incidence of investor types associated with the degree of valuation uncertainty further conditions
the propensity of informed investors to participate. As an extension to the existing underpricing paradigm, we
add credit enhancement to the model as some reservation utility in the form of fractional investor repayment,
which sanctions the scope of profitable informed investment.4
                                                                                                                                                            
2 Due to private information informed investors have superior knowledge about the actual quality of the security issue,
whose valuation uncertainty is indicated by the precision measure of the private signal received by informed investors.
3 The option value of informed investment increases (decreases) the higher (lower) the valuation uncertainty and the
lower (higher) the precision of investor beliefs, which implies that more investors become informed as information
gathering about the true value of the transaction becomes more profitable. An increase in the number of informed
investors raises the rational expectation of uniformed investors to be allocated shares in a disproportionately large
number of unprofitable (bad) deals (“winner’s curse dilemma”). Uninformed investors will require sufficient
underpricing to compensate for ex ante valuation uncertainty (“ex ante uncertainty hypothesis”) as agency cost of adverse
selection. Also informed investors would only commit to profitable, underpriced investments. If the size of the overall
investor pool is kept unchanged, the altered composition of the investor pool due to a larger share of informed investors
at higher valuation uncertainty changes the prices both types of investors would be prepared to pay.
4 If issuers retain some reservation utility the resultant fractional repayment increases demands on the minimum issue
quality.6
We find that issuers maximise own payoffs and derive an optimal solution to the design problem if their
allocation to informed investors remains large enough to elicit “truth telling” in return for profitable
investment, irrespective of the pricing regime (uniform or discriminatory). A higher allocation to informed
investors means that a larger portion of the transaction is subject to underpricing, which in turn reduces
overall issue payoffs. The presence of an unknown number of uninformed investors only matters as a
participation constraint of optimal allocation under uniform pricing, which requires an adjustment of the
allocation choice to still guarantee profitable informed investment. Increased uninformed investment demand
at lower valuation uncertainty limits the utility of informed investment. Thus, the composition of the investor
pool ensures that informed investors5 appropriate higher relative profit than uninformed types. We find that
issuers maximise payoffs under uniform pricing by keeping the actual quality of the transaction, valuation
uncertainty and any reservation utility as low as possible. This rule of action establishes an “efficient frontier”
of allocation choices, which implies higher individual net payoff from informed investment relative to
uninformed investment.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The chapter begins with a review of the literature, linking
stylised facts about asset securitisation with information processing under asymmetric information in matters
pertinent to efficient security issuance in securitisation markets. In the next sections we present a simple issue
design model without intermediaries, where a direct revelation mechanism (DRM) determines the optimal
allocation choice for maximum issuer payoffs at varying degrees of valuation uncertainty and different pricing
regimes – assuming asymmetric information requires “winner’s curse”-type underpricing and uninformed
investment demand clears the market. With information processing by informed investors taking a critical
role in security issuance, we first derive an acceptance set of profitable informed investment, which prescribes
an optimal allocation schedule for a perceived issue quality. We then determine expected issuer proceeds if
informed investors maximise their payoffs within this acceptance set according to a fixed price-quantity
schedule. In particular, we study how the incidence of uninformed investors at varying levels of valuation
                                                
5 Informed investors can infer valuation uncertainty and the incidence of uninformed investment from the precision of7
uncertainty impacts the utility from informed investment under uniform pricing conditions. Subsequently, we
introduce endogenous price discovery through auction-style allocation preference as a continuous function of
perceived issue quality (in keeping with a fixed price-quantity schedule) within the acceptance set of profitable
informed investment to derive maximum issuer net payoffs. Finally, we provide a numerical illustration of the
relationship between perceived issue quality and net issuer proceeds contingent on the degree of valuation
uncertainty (see section V). The chapter concludes with a summary of significant findings and
recommendations.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND EMPIRICAL REASONING
The design problem of security issuance under asymmetric information and valuation uncertainty has been
extensively studied in past research on the underwriting process and investor behaviour in stock markets.6
However, so far the well-understood economic rationale behind the alignment of asset pricing and share
allocation choices to investor incentives has not been transposed into related areas of external finance, such
as asset securitisation. Asset securitisation represents a cost-efficient and flexible structured finance
instrument to convert illiquid present or future asset claims of varying maturity and quality into tradable debt
securities by re-packaging and diversifying receivables into securitisable asset portfolios (liquidity transformation
and asset diversification).7 Transactions typically involve reference portfolios of one or more (fairly illiquid) asset
exposures, from which stratified positions (or tranches) with different seniority are created, reflecting
                                                                                                                                                            
their private signal, which qualifies the allocation schedule of profitable investment.
6 See Welch and Ritter (2002) for a recent overview of the literature in this regard.
7 Asset securitisation initially started as a way of depository institutions, non-bank finance companies and other
corporations to explore new sources of asset funding either through moving assets off their balance sheet or raising cash
by borrowing against balance sheet assets (“liquifying”). In the meantime, securitisation goes a long way in advancing
two main objectives: (i) to curtail balance sheet growth and realise certain accounting objectives and balance sheet
patterns, and/or (ii) to reduce economic cost of capital as a proportion of asset exposure and ease regulatory capital
requirements (by lower bad debt provisions) to manage risk more efficiently. Most commonly, a balanced mix of both
objectives and further operational and strategic considerations determine the type of securitisation – traditional or
synthetic – in the way issuers envisage securitisation as a method to shed excessive asset exposures.8
different degrees of investment risk.8 The existing literature in securitisation primarily focuses on the
implications of potential agency costs arising from adverse selection and moral hazard sanctioned by capital
market investors.
In securitisation, issuers and/or investors tend to retain some of the securitised asset exposure and/or
provide other means of structural support to build investor confidence in the quality of their security issue.
Frequently, such risk sharing agreement between issuers and investors comes in the form of an equity-like
claim9 on the expected losses of the securitised assets in the effort to limit agency costs of asymmetric
information due to inherent valuation uncertainty.10 These information problems associated with the lack of
external verifiability of securitised assets and the risk-sharing arrangements between issuers and investors are
common considerations in existing security design models. We reconcile existing approaches to model the
information structure of investors and partial asset retention by issuers as crucial elements to security issuance
under asymmetric information. In order to specify (i) information processing of informed investors as “truth
tellers” in an auction-style allocation choice under asymmetric information and (ii) how valuation uncertainty
affects the degree of underpricing, we amalgamate previous findings from (i) economic models with multiple
equilibrium outcomes from information processing and coordination games, (ii) security design model of
                                                
8 These positions may take the form of fully/partially funded asset-backed securities or unfunded derivatives.
9 The structural risk sharing arrangement between issuers and investors through subordination, which concentrates most
default loss in the most junior tranche, also entails leveraged investment due to the difference of tranche sizes across
different levels of seniority. Tranches with little or no subordination are more affected by the mean and volatility of
default losses (expected and unexpected losses) (Gibson, 2004), i.e. their ratio of relative tranche losses to relative
portfolio losses is higher than for more senior tranches. So we would expect an ever greater effect of adverse selection
from valuation uncertainty on leveraged exposures in securitised asset portfolios. Issuers and investors might also be
faced with the prospect of high trading cost (Duffie and Gârleanu, 2001) associated with a small market volume of
outstanding issues, liquidity premium to the agency cost from adverse selection.
10 Early models suggest signalling (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1997; Leland and Pyle, 1977) as a means to curb investor
uncertainty, where sellers of a security issues convey the value of the security by their willingness to partake in the risk as
they retain a portion of the issue. Riddiough (1997) takes a slightly different twist on risk sharing. He proposes a
theoretical model of asset-retention as an effort choice by issuers to mitigate external price discounting as agency cost of9
debt contracts with partial repayment and (iii) auction-style solutions to IPO mechanisms. In order to
determine how informed investors process private information we resort to the concept of adjusted investor
beliefs in a coordination game setting proposed by Morris and Shin (2000) in the context of bank runs, where
the discrepancy between the indeterminacy of beliefs and the objective assessment could lead to suboptimal
economic outcomes.11 In particular, we adopt the definition of a precision measure of private signals to
specify informed investment decisions as a basis of a direct revelation mechanism (DRM). Second, we borrow the
optimal design of lending contracts with partial repayment from Inderst and Müller (2002) in order to derive
the first-best condition of optimal informed investment if a reservation utility associated with credit enhancement
reduces expected payoffs from investment. This approach is in stark contrast to many erroneous accounts in
the literature, which regard credit enhancement as a signalling device12 Finally, we resort to the rich literature
about IPO underpricing (Malakhov, 2003; Welch and Ritter, 2002; Myerson, 1981) of corporate share issues
as the theoretical basis for the specification of an optimal security auction under asymmetric information with
maximum issuer payoffs. We rule out all but asymmetric information from the list of researched explanations
for IPO underpricing,13 as most of the legal and strategic considerations of alternative explanatory approaches
                                                                                                                                                            
rational investor beliefs about superior information10 about the securitised asset risk held by non-recourse single-purpose
entities in conventional securitisation structures.
11 In their view multiple equilibria assume that economic outcomes result from actions motivated by the beliefs of
individuals. However, any indeterminacy of beliefs, although these beliefs themselves are rationale and consistent with
fundamental economic features, yields quite different states of affairs, which might not be perfectly in a nod to what
would be deemed appropriate judging by the underlying information to start with.
12 Since credit enhancement compensates for the rating shortfall between the rating quality and the desired rating quality
of the transaction (as a completely discretionary choice), the level of credit enhancement cannot increase information
transparency as a signalling device.
13 In classical IPO models issuers offer new shares at a selling price below fair market value (“underpricing”) due to one
or more of the following factors: (i) asymmetric information, (ii) institutional and systemic constraints, (iii) strategic
considerations, and (iv) ownership and control. However, individual characteristics of national stock markets and
disparate statutory regulations limit how these factors might actually explain the reasons for discounted IPOs. Besides
asymmetric information other main reasons for underpricing are defined as: (i) legal risk of violations against securities
laws (“lawsuit hypothesis”), price support and book building as a mechanism of information revelation could explain
high levels of underpricing as investors require significant compensation for systemic uncertainty and institutional
constraints by means of underpricing; (ii) pricing and/or explicit rationing bias give rise to restrictions on ownership and10
do not apply to securitisation. Asymmetric information models suggest a positive correlation between ex ante
valuation uncertainty and underpricing. The “winner’s curse” problem is one of the asymmetric information
models, whose economic reasoning for IPO underpricing seems to be most in tune with empirical
observations about the workings of securitisation markets. The “winner’s curse” problem postulated by Rock
(1986) implies that asymmetric information about the actual issue quality entails adverse selection of investor
as regards share allocation, where informed investors benefit from better information.14 Since the information
advantage of informed investors carries higher gross payoffs as the degree of valuation uncertainty rises,
higher informed investment demand in the composition of the investor pool entails a higher degree of
underpricing (to maintain the participation incentive of investors). Hence, higher gross payoffs from
informed investment exacerbate the “winner’s curse” problem. Uninformed investors would rationally believe
that they receive a disproportionately high allocation of transactions of poor quality.15
It is commonplace to argue that securitisation markets are notorious for weak information disclosure about
underlying reference portfolios, intricate auditing standards and legal uncertainty surrounding the estimation
of expected investor return and the complex enforcement of restrictive covenants and redemption criteria.
These contingencies and information constraints impede efficient asset pricing and hinder full understanding
of the fundamental risk involved in securitisation transactions.16 Low market liquidity of securitisation
                                                                                                                                                            
control; (iii) strategic considerations (“manager’s strategic underpricing explanation”), where underpricing occurs as an
agency cost that results from strategic considerations by managers to benefit from higher expected shareholding value at
lock-up expiration if underpricing creates an information momentum, which shifts the demand curve for the issued
shares outwards (Aggarwal et al., 2002). Hence, managers trade-off substantial underpricing against a maximisation of
personal wealth when they have their first opportunity to sell shares.
14 Since informed investors condition their decision to request some allocation on positive payoff, this allocative benefit
results in underpricing and increases in valuation uncertainty. Hence, the benefit from generating private information
production is similar to investment in a call option on the IPO with the offering price as strike price and the valuation of
the issue as the underlying asset price. The call option reflects the degree of underpricing. As the option value increases
with uncertainty about the underlying valuation, more investors become informed.
15 Some empirical studies confirming the winner’s curse problem on the basis of allocation rates of IPO issues include
Koh and Walter (1989), Levis (1990), Keloharju (1993) as well as Amihud et al. (2003).
16 See also Rutledge (2004) on the frequently decried absence of widespread standardisation in securitisation markets.11
instruments suggests substantial valuation uncertainty.17 In the presence of disintegrated capital markets, the
low degree of informed investment could provide grounds for discounted offerings to compensate for
investment risk. So, the adaptation of asymmetric information models of IPO pricing has intuitive appeal.
Moreover, participants in securitisation markets18 learn about allocation rates, which award all agents
regardless of their size the same chance of placing a successful bid. Consequently, the “winner’s curse”
problem seems a plausible cause to underpricing of securitisation transactions.
III.  MODEL
We tender a security (issue) design model, where a single monopolistic issuer of securitised claims maximises
his proceeds through an optimal allocation that is incentive compatible with informed investment demand.
The model describes a simplified issuing process in a simplified securitisation market consisting of one issuer
without endowment19 and two discrete types of investors, with competition limited to investors only. The
issuer offers securitised claims to outside investors at some selling price after having sounded out the
perceived issue quality by taking initial quantity orders from sophisticated investors on the basis of a
commonly understood pricing scheme. The total number of claims is set to unity. We distinguish between
two discrete types of buyers: informed investors I  (e.g. large institutional investors, banks, hedge fund
managers) and uninformed investors  1, θ θ   ∈Ψ=  (e.g. retail investors), whose types are defined by nature
ex ante as measures of informed and uninformed demand. Informed investors act as quasi-market makers and
                                                
17 Substantial liquidity risk and rent seeking from information advantage has confined most investment in securitisation
markets to “buy-and-hold” strategies by large and well-informed institutional investors, insurance companies, banks and
other financial institutions; yet evidence about the degree of uninformed investment remains inconclusive for loss of
empirical observations.
18 The securitisation market consists of two types of investors: individual investors and institutional investors. While the
majority of investors, which mostly invest in high-volume issue tranches with high seniority (such as big insurance
companies), could be regarded as uninformed, the small portion of institutional and private investors function is
informed and invests in junior and riskier. As senior tranches outweigh lower rated tranches by far in notional volume,
uninformed investor claim a sizeable part of investment demand in securitisation markets.
19 i.e. funds generated from the issue accrue irrespective of other assets the issuer might hold on his books.12
price setters during initial placement, before uninformed investors clear the market after price discovery by
informed types. The probability of being an informed or uninformed investor is proportional to the incidence
of types, where  () θ + II  is the probability of being informed. The distribution of uninformed investment θ
and the total number of informed investors I is common knowledge. Informed investors have sufficient
funds to buy the entire transaction (or as much as available). The same applies to the total number of
uninformed investors. In keeping with Rock (1986) we assume uniform informed investment, where each
informed investor can be allocated more than one share (i.e. varying quantity orders). Uninformed investors
can only buy at most one share each and have sufficient funds to buy the entire issue at any valuation
irrespective of the offering price. If informed investors decide to buy (at some pricing schedule based on
allocation), we anticipate rationing of uninformed investors in the sense of the “winner’s curse” adverse
selection problem in Rock (1986).20 All agents in the model are assumed to be risk-neutral. The issue
valuation r is a random variable  ()
1 , ~ ~
− α r N r  with precision α . The issuer does not know the realisation of
uninformed investment θ  and offers the transaction with promised repayment  ( ) [] 0,1 cr C ∈=  to informed
investors  iI ∈  at a fixed price-quantity schedule. Informed investors learn about the actual valuation by
gathering precise but not perfect information about the quality of the issue before they tender a bid.21 They
observe the realisation of valuation r  as a i.i.d. private (and costless)22 noisy signal  r ς ε =+, where
                                                
20 See also section II for a brief review of the rationale of underpricing in the context of initial public offerings of stocks
(IPO).
21 This superior capability of interpreting the investment risk of securitised exposures in a more informative way could
be interpreted in several ways. Informed investment by large brokerage firms or other financial institutions with expert
knowledge, either within or outside the issuer’s industry, could stem from their own expertise in originating and
monitoring credit risk and structured risk (i.e. market and asset liquidity, interest and currency volatility as well as
organisational risk of asymmetric information in lending relationships), such as credit risk analysis (Boot and Thakor,
2000). Similarly, Inderst and Müller (2002) suggest that also gathering new information about macroeconomic facts, such
as market growth and product demand, effecting the outcome of issue performance might help improve the accuracy of
risk assessment. Both arguments indicate that informed investors are able to extract private information about the actual
issue quality and update their beliefs accordingly.
22 Inderst and Müller (2002) point out two prime inefficiencies associated with the information production through noisy
signals: (i) misclassification of the actual valuation r, so that the action of informed investment after observing signal s13
()
1 ~0 , N ε β
−  and  () ( ) ( ) ( )
2 21 exp 2 2 fr ςς β π β
−−  =− −  . Due to perfect information sharing all
informed investors form uniform beliefs about the actual issue valuation on aggregate; however, we rule out
information extraction by means of simple cross-reporting (Crémer and McLean, 1988).23 Informed investors
adjust their beliefs ς  about realisation r  with non-decreasing contractual repayment  () r c  to the weighted
measure24  ( ) ( ) sr α βς α β =+ +   with  [ ] ∈ ≡ 0,1 sS .25 They have an incentive to participate only if the noisy
signal  ς  of private information is sufficiently accurate, so that precision measure
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 γ ααβ β α β =+ +  of the private signal received by informed investors satisfies γ π ≤ 2  (see
section IV.B). The precision also indicates the degree of valuation uncertainty.
Our design problem maximises issuer payoffs contingent on an efficient rule of action, which prescribes a
particular allocation preference of informed investors with belief s  to obtain positive payoffs for a given
price-quantity schedule. Informed investors request some allocation  ( ) 1 0 ≤ ≤ s q  if and only if the fixed price-
quantity schedule of general property  () ()
a ps qs =   ( ) 01 a ≤ ≤  implied by an auction-style allocation
preference as a continuous function of perceived issue quality yields profitable investment  ( ) ( ) ( ) E cr s ps > ,
where  ( ) 0 rp s ≤<  and  r θ > . The acceptance set of allocation choices associated with profitable informed
                                                                                                                                                            
would constitute either overpriced investment or forgone profitable investment; and (ii) mismatch of actual efforts taken
by informed investors and required effort level for appropriate risk analysis (Manove et al., 2001). In order to remedy
these inefficiencies, for simplicity we consider (i) the information content of the signal fixed and (ii) the effort of risk
analysis essentially costless (instead of the proposition of a marginal cost associated with the signal).
23 In contrast, uninformed investors behave quasi-atomistically, so their allocation implies forgone informed investment,
given sufficient availability of investment funds by both categories of investors.
24 Assuming that uncertainty about the valuation r  would otherwise eliminate private signals ς  unless they were
sufficiently precise, informed investors adjust their subjective beliefs ς  about the expected returns by the degree of
perceived accuracy of private information.
25 The acceptance set of adjusted beliefs for profitable informed investment is adapted from the work by Morris and
Shin (2000) on the indeterminacy of beliefs as a source of co-ordination failure. Their model of bank runs is based on a14
investment formalises a direct revelation mechanism (DRM). The issuer allocates the residual portion of the
transaction to uninformed investors at the same (i.e. uniform) or a higher (i.e. discriminate) offering price.
Uninformed investors are unaware of the realisation of both r and θ . If the uniformed price is still lower
than fair market price, passive uninformed investment demand clears the market.26 We attribute no additional
function to uninformed investors. If informed investors do not appropriate any profit for a given issue
quality, they refrain from disclosing information about actual issue quality through an acceptable allocation
level. Without allocation to informed investors, everybody receives zero payoffs.27 Hence, our issue design
model relies on efficient allocation as the only strategic choice variable to (i) maximise issuer payoffs under
optimal information extraction from informed investors and (ii) ensure their as price setters of uninformed
investment demand.28
IV.  OPTIMAL ISSUING PROCESS AND ALLOCATION
Our basic model framework of optimal security issuance relies on the conventional allocation-based argument
of IPO underpricing due to asymmetric information between issuers and investors in keeping with the
“winner’s curse” problem (Rock, 1986). However, our approach goes beyond the rationing of uninformed
investors as the main determinant of underpricing. In a general auction-style design, we maximise issuer
proceeds conditional on price discounting needed to guarantee profitable informed investment over a positive
                                                                                                                                                            
Bayes Nash equilibrium of an imperfect information game. In our case, we treat each realisation of perceived valuation
as a continuum of varying investment decisions by informed investors in a one-shot game.
26 This issue process requires waiting to be the dominant strategy of uninformed investors if the appellation of being
informed is limited only to those investors who can adjust their beliefs about actual issue quality based on the realisation
of signal ς . So no uninformed can pretend to be informed by definition.
27 Since any allocation of claims will only take place if informed investors decide to participate, all poor transactions are
singled out through this direct revelation mechanism, and, hence, have no effect on the optimal allocation and pricing
schedule of the issuing process. This implies that issuers would not be able to solicit any investment demand unless a
true market valuation (as some “seal of approval”) has been sought from informed investors.
28 Only the proportion of informed investment is common knowledge, and both types of investors have sufficient funds
on aggregate to theoretically buy the entire transaction.15
measure of issue quality for a given degree of valuation uncertainty about securitised assets reflected in the
composition of the investor pool. In extension to the “winner’s curse” problem, we derive a sustainable
equilibrium solution for an optimal issuing process with endogenous price discovery, in which the allocation
choice satisfies informed investment demand as a continuous function of perceived issue quality. At the same
time, issuers are able to extract maximum surplus from informed investors in a direct revelation mechanism
(DRM).
Before we present an auction-style allocation choice to derive maximum issuer payoffs under uniform and
discriminatory pricing, we solve the optimisation problem of informed investors within an efficient
acceptance set of adjusted beliefs about actual issue quality (see section B), which prescribes a profile of
profitable allocation choices at a fixed price-quantity schedule. We firs derive expected issuer returns under
uniform and discriminatory pricing if informed investors were granted optimal allocation (see section C).
Then we introduce an auction-style allocation preference as a continuous function of perceived issue quality
within the acceptance set of profitable informed investment, which allows issuers to maximise own payoffs
by extracting information surplus from price discovery through DRM by informed investors (Malakhov,
2003; Myerson, 1981) (see section D). Let us now revisit the fundamental rationale of the Rock IPO model,
before we derive the acceptance set of optimal informed investment and an allocation schedule under DRM,
which maximises profitable informed investment at a fixed price-quantity schedule.
A.  The Rock (1986) model revisited
The aforementioned ex ante rationing problem of uninformed investors for an issuing process of “good deals”
at a fixed price offering equates to the widely known “winner’s curse” problem of IPOs in equity markets.
According to Rock (1986), less privileged investors are crowded out by investors with superior information
about the true value of the issue, who would only invest if shares priced at their expected value or lower, else
they withdraw from the market in response to an observed bad quality of the IPO shares. This argument16
explains why issuers would need to discount uniform offering price below fair market value in order to
compensate uniformed investors for a “lemons problem” (Akerlof, 1970) of share allocation. Most shares
allocated to uninformed issuers are “overpriced” compared to shares desired by informed investors. So
underpricing accommodates the rational expectation that a disproportionately large share of “bad deals” are
allocated to uninformed investment demand. Uninformed investors receive a full allocation of all shares only
for overpriced issues (with informed investment being limited to “good deals”). A simplified version of the
Rock model in Biais et al. (2002) conveys the essence of the “winner’s curse” dilemma of issuers.29,30
                                                
29 In line with Rock (1986) an issuer offers a total number of shares at uniform price p, where all informed investors
(with individually varying quantity orders) demand at most I shares, whilst each of θ  uninformed buyers are allocated at
most one share. This assumption reflects allocative benefits associated with better information about the actual issue
quality, where only individual allocation of shares to uninformed investors matters to model an optimal allocation
schedule in the presence of investor rationing. Informed investors request I shares on aggregate if the IPO is a “good
deal”, i.e. the market valuation ν  of the issue is larger than the offering price p. If  p ν <  informed investors abstain
from investing and leave all shares to uninformed investors. Consequently, higher overall informed demand and
associated rationing of investors for “good deals” results in a “winner’s curse problem” – uninformed investors receive a
disproportionately large amount of shares in “bad deals” if their bids are successful. Hence, uninformed investors would
expect a “price discount” proportional to the rationing rate, so that  ( ) [ ] 0 > − = p E U ν τ π , where the rationing rate
() θ τ + = I 1  if  p > ν , else  θ τ 1 = . Since the covariance of τ  and ν  is positive, it follows that  () p E > ν . Informed
investors have the weaker pricing condition  [ ] 0 > − = p E I ν π .
30 Note that the participation incentive of informed investors to engage in information production represents a call
option on the actual value of the IPO, which they will only exercise (by requesting shares in the IPO) if the underlying
expected value exceeds the offering price (as strike price). The value of the option held by informed investors increases
with valuation uncertainty. More investors become informed as higher information asymmetry between issuers and
investors increases the option value, which exacerbates the “winner’s curse problem”. Higher uncertainty also implies
that a declining fraction of uninformed investors suffers from higher chances of being allocated a disproportionately
large amount of shares in “bad deals”. Empirical evidence of IPOs suggests that the degree of asymmetry seems to be
correlated with the size of the issue. The larger the issue the higher the chances of professional management and
transparency, so more information about the true valuation reduces the degree of asymmetric information.17
B.  Optimisation problem of informed investors
Since price discovery in our DRM is contingent on profitable informed investment, we first derive the
acceptance set of allocation choices that generate positive net payoffs at a fixed price-quantity schedule for
eligible (i.e. sufficiently precise) beliefs about actual issue quality. At this stage we represent uniform informed
investment demand by one informed investor. Informed investor belief s  about the true issue quality is
associated with an absolutely continuous distribution function  ( ) s Gr  of valuation  ∈ rR  with positive
conditional density  () > 0 s gr  continuous in the interior of S,  where  ( ) ( ) r g r g s s'  strictly increases for all
R r ∈ , given any pair of signals () ( ) s s s Ω ∈ ' , w i t h   s s > ' [ Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP)]. The
conditional and unconditional expected return of the issue at valuation r is defined as  ( ) ∫ = R s s dr r rg µ  and
() () ∫S s ds r g s f  respectively. Given a repayment contract31  ( ) r c  with  ( ) 0 fc> , we re-specify expected investor
return as
( ) ( ) ( ) ss R ur c rgr d r =∫ .( 1 )
If the noisy signal ς  is deemed to be sufficiently precise, informed investors would only request an allocation
( ) 01 qs ≤≤  as a continuous function of updated investor beliefs s, where the associated offering price
implies positive payoff for  ( ) ( ) s ps u r ≤ , which is binding at the optimum.32 In order to devise a rule of
                                                
31 Fractional repayment arises if issuers retain some expected return (“first loss provision”/“credit enhancement”) as a
positive effort choice to guarantee residual claims over and above full payment on issued securities. We follow the credit
decision approach by Maskin and Tirole (1990 and 1992) in modelling the specification of the overall repayment level to
investors.
32 This specification restricts the specification of repayment in Inderst and Müller (2002), where informed investment
maximise gross payoff for a menu  M m∈ of possible repayment contracts  ( ) C r cm ∈ , to a single repayment contract. In
keeping with Innes (1990) as well as Marzo and Duffie (1999) we assume that repayment is non-decreasing in investment
returns. In lending relationships borrowers could realise ex post arbitrage gains by borrowing cash to boost expected18
action for optimal informed investment, we need to specify a lower bound of informed investor belief s with
associated conditional investor payoff  ( ) s ur to yield profitable investment.
Fig 1. Cumulative distribution function of updated investor beliefs.
Informed investors adjust their beliefs about the realisation r  with contractual repayment  ( ) r c  to the
weighted measure  ( ) ( ) sr α βς α β =+ +   with  [ ] ∈ ≡ 0,1 sS  upon observing noisy signal ς . The
distribution functions  () Fs and  ( ) F ς  with  ( ) 0 fs>  and  ( ) 0 f ς >  are absolutely continuous and common
knowledge. Informed investors consider ς  sufficiently accurate only if precision measure
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 γ ααβ β α β =+ +  is small enough to satisfy γ π ≤ 2 , so that (weighted) signal s  meets critical
value * s  as unique solution to the cumulative distribution function  () ( ) γ = Φ−  ** ss r , where  ( ) Φ .
denotes a standard normal distribution.33 Higher precision (at a low γ ) reflects lower valuation uncertainty of
informed investor belief s about the realisation of r. The critical level  * s  (see Fig. I) is obtained at the
intersection of the c.d.f. of  ( ) Φ .  with the 45 degree line, which divides the indeterminate region [ ] 0,1
around its mid point. The critical level  * s  diverges to the left from mean r ~ the less precise the signal.
                                                                                                                                                            
future cash flows and qualify for some lending criteria if contractual repayment generated from an investment project
was to decrease over some subset of realised project payoffs (Innes, 1990).
33 In this set-up we ignore the co-ordination problem of several agents in Morris and Shin (2000).
() () γ =Φ − ss r
 r * s
0.5
119
Conversely, if the signal becomes less noisy,  * s  approximates r ~ at  () 5 . 0 . = Φ . As noise becomes negligible
in the limit, the curve of  ( ) Φ .  flattens out, and γ  and  * s  tend to zero and 0.5 respectively. Once signal
* s s >  passes muster as sufficiently precise private information, informed investors consider a profitable
allocation level that satisfies  ( ) ( ) s ur p s ≥ . At  * s  the utility of private information from noisy signal ς  is
zero and non-random. The expectation of r is only conditional on  * s , which is  * s  itself. Since noise β  of
signal s is independent of r, informed investor are uniformly indifferent at  * s  in expectation of valuation r.
Since all eligible signals  S s s ∈ > *  of sufficient precision belong to the absolutely continuous distribution
function  ( ) s Gr and each allocation level is subject to a fixed price-quantity schedule with the general
property  () ()
a ps qs =   ( ) 01 a ≤≤ , by monotonicity we obtain an optimisation problem with a simple
crossing property and an unconstrained maximum. Provided that informed investors only disclose their
private information if their allocation generates positive net payoff, we define two cases of the relationship
between (implied) offering price and expected investment return:  ( ) ( ) s ur p s <  and  ( ) ( ) s ur p s ≥ , which
rules out the trivial case of either positive or negative signals for all levels of adjusted investor beliefs s  about
valuation  rR ∈ . Since we assume the margin of indifference to divulge private information to be a zero-
probability event, we include the case  ( ) ( ) s ur p s =  of zero payoffs from informed investment in the
acceptance set as boundary condition. Note that the repayment level restricts the acceptance set of profitable
informed investment.34
                                                
34 With full repayment (i.e. no restriction on conditional return from valuation r by some repayment contract), we would
need to distinguish the less restrictive conditions  ( ) s p s µ <  and  ( ) s p s µ > . This consideration reflects the repayment
choice in securitisation – the lower the quality of securitised assets, the higher the level of required credit support as
reservation utility and the lower repayment from the realised portfolio value as higher expected default reduces expected
returns from the securitised asset pool.20
Lemma.  The acceptance set of informed investors for repayment c(r) is defined by
() () () { } *s . t . s ss S s ss s u r p sS Ω≡ ∈≥∧ ≥ ≥ ⊆  with cut-off signal  [ ] 0,1 s∈  w i t h  z e r o  p r o f i t  f r o m  i n f o r m e d
investment at  ( ) ( ) s ur p s = . Unless  ( ) ( ) s ur p s <  with  1 s = ,  * ss ≥  is unique and informed investment occurs for all
*0 sss ≥≥ >.
Based on Lemma, we can derive the net payoff from optimal informed investment for allocation choice  ( ) qs
and conditional return  ( ) s ur with  () > 0 s gr  for each belief s within the acceptance set  ( ) s Ω . Informed
investors derive the first best solution of their optimisation problem by requesting allocation  ( ) 01 I qs ≤ ≤
for payment of offering price  ( ) I ps , which maximises the concave objective function
( )
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() max Is I I s qs Us q s u r p s fsd s
Ω =− ∫ ,( 2 )
where the optimal allocation choice  () ()( )
* 1 a
Is qs ur a = +  implies  () () ()( )
** 1
a
II s ps qs ur a = =+  under
the general property of a fixed price-quantity schedule. Note that non-decreasing repayment  ( ) cr yields
surplus  ()
() () () ()
*
Is s s
qs ur f s d s µ
Ω
− ∫  as reservation utility from  () () ()
() ()
**
Is I s
qs psf s d s µ
Ω
− ∫  before
repayment at valuation r. Since informed investors optimise net payoff  ( )≥ 0 Us  over acceptance set  ( ) s Ω
the probability of profitable informed investment for all eligible private signals is illustrated as the shaded area
in Fig. II for the distribution function  ( ) ( ) Fcr  and  ( ) Fs of expected conditional return and adjusted belief,
where the expectation of realisation r  for precision measure γ  is exactly  * s . Hence, this probability
measure reflects the chances of private information about the actual issue to be sufficiently accurate for
consideration of profitable investment within acceptance set  ( ) s Ω  in Lemma. We will revisit this interim21
observation at a later stage of our analysis (see section D) when we were to represent issuer payoff over the
entire range of  [] 0,1 r ∈ .
Fig II. Probability of profitable informed investment given updated investor belief.
C.  Issuer payoffs under optimal informed investment
For illustrative purposes, we first determine issuer payoffs for our issue design problem with price discovery
through first-best informed investment at optimal allocation  ( )
*
I qs  within the acceptance set under uniform
and discriminatory pricing,35 with informed investors acting as price setters for uninformed investment demand.
Under uniform pricing, both informed and uninformed investors pay the same offering price, which creates
straightforward incentive compatibility. All investors obtain positive payoff with certainty, with uninformed
investors being rationed at a rate of  ( ) ( ) θ τ + = s qI
* 1 . With total issue volume set to unity, complete allocation
at uniform price  ()
*
I ps  generates issuer payoff
                                                
35 Note that by restricting ourselves to solving the design problem for maximum informed investor payoff, we
deliberately disregard valuation uncertainty and the associated composition of the investment demand as a determinant
of the optimal allocation choice by the issuer to achieve a sustainable equilibrium outcome.
 r * s
() ≥   Pr 0 Us () Fs
() Frs
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() () Fcrs22
( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( )
()
*
0 1 Is s U ss s a E p s fsd s u r a fsd s u r fsd s
ΩΩ Ω → Π= = + = ∫∫ ∫ ,( 3 )
where informed investors obtain  () I Us  in (2). Since the remainder,  ( )
* 1 I qs − , is tendered to uninformed
investors at the same offering price to clear the market, they each receive expected net payoff
() () () () ()
() ()
** 1
1( ) Is I U s
Us q s u r p s fsd s
θ Ω
=− − ∫ .( 4 )
Issuers can increase their expected issue payoff  ( )U E Π  through a minimum allocation of claims at a slightly
discounted offering price within acceptance set  ( ) s Ω . A low value of  ( ) s ur further limits the absolute
measure of underpicing. However, uniform pricing could weaken incentives of informed investors to engage
in price discovery for an efficient allocation choice, as net payoff  ( )I Us  of informed investors might even be
smaller than individual payoff  ( )U Us  of uninformed investors at high valuation uncertainty. If
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
** * * 11 II I I qs qs qs qs θθ −≥ ⇔ ≤ −  informed investors36 may choose to misrepresent their type
for a given expected conditional return  ( ) s ur. Only a high incidence of uninformed investors associated with
low valuation uncertainty preserves informed investment demand for efficient allocation choices in  ( ) s Ω
under uniform pricing.
Note that higher valuation uncertainty is reflected in lower precision (i.e. a high γ  measure, see section B) of
informed investor belief s about the realisation of r, which decreases acceptance set  ( ) s Ω  as the critical value
s* increases. If  () I Us  were to be kept constant, a higher allocation  ( )
*
I qs  associated with a smaller range of
                                                
36 For the determination of this threshold of uninformed investment demand, we maintain the assumption of uniform
informed investment behaviour, such that our comparative statics are only influenced by the number of informed
investors in relation to positive net payoffs from investment.23
profitable allocation choices leaves a smaller residual allocation  ( )
* 1 I qs −  to uninformed investors θ . Since
uninformed investors are limited to one share each, higher rationing at lower  () ( ) θ τ + = s qI
* 1  leaves a smaller
number of uninformed investors θ  in the investor pool, who might possibly claim  () () UI Us Us ≥ .37
Proposition 1 [Valuation uncertainty and acceptance set]. Lower valuation uncertainty increases the acceptance
set  ( ) s Ω and decreases both the optimal allocation to informed investors and underpricing. Lower (higher) valuation uncertainty
also implies a higher (lower) incidence of uninformed investors.
Proposition 2 [Uniform pricing]. Under uniform pricing the issuer extracts most informed investor surplus by keeping
the perceived valuation and valuation uncertainty as low as possible within acceptance set  ( ) s Ω according to Proposition 1, while
preventing misrepresentation by informed investors.
Alternatively, issuers might have discretion in tendering the residual allocation to uninformed investors at an
offering price higher than the offering price  ( )
*
I ps  implied by a first-best allocation to informed investors.
Since both types of investors act independently, discriminatory pricing in favour of informed investors allows
the issuer to extract more surplus from investors, while it eliminates the danger of misrepresentation by
informed investors. Discriminatory pricing can satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint  () ( ) IU Us Us ≥
invariant to the incidence of uninformed investors. The issuer allocates the proportion  () 1 0
* ≤ ≤ s qI  of the
issue to informed investors at price  ( )
*
I ps . The remainder  ( ) ( ) ≤−
* 1 UI qs qs  is offered to uninformed
                                                
37 At the same time, we could also argue this aspect from the perspective of underpricing in line with the IPO
underpricing model by Rock (1986). Valuation uncertainty represents an (implicit) “outside option”, where uninformed
issuers would expect higher underpricing associated with a higher rationing rate for higher levels of valuation
uncertainty, which increases the option value. Lower valuation uncertainty implies higher levels of market information
about the true issue quality and lower discounting of the uniform offering price as uninformed investors would assume
lower chances of being outsmarted by informed investors.24
investors to clear the market. The maximum offering price  ( ) U ps  the issuer can charge to uninformed
investors is
() () () ( )
()
() () ()
*
** * max ,
I
UI s s I
U
qs
ps psur ur ps
qs
θβ
  =− − 
 
,( 5 )
which solves inequality
() () () () () () ()
() () () () () ()
()
** 1
Is I Us U IU ss Us Us qs ur ps fsd s q s ur p s fsd s ββ
θ ΩΩ ≥⇔ − ≥ − ∫∫ ,( 6 )
where fraction 0 1 β <≤  denotes the multiple of the payoff received by all informed investors at allocation
()
*
I qs  to the maximum net payoff of each uninformed investor at allocation  ( )( )
* 1 UI qs qs ≤− . The measure
β  becomes binding if informed investors expect β -times higher informed payoff than individual
uninformed investment payoff, which requires  1 θ β ∂ ∂= − . Thus, expected issuer payoff under
discriminatory pricing would be
( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
()
() ()
( ) ( )
()
*
** *
0,
1 UI
IU U I s D ss s a
qs qs
E psfs d s qs ps ps fs d s urfs d s
ΩΩ Ω →
=−
Π= + − = ∫∫ ∫(7)
Proof of equation (7). See Appendix.
Since  () () ≥
**
UI ps ps , the issuer could extract more surplus from uninformed investors, so that expected
issuer gross payoffs under discriminatory pricing satisfies25
() () ( ) () () () () ()
() () ()
()
1
12 1
1
s a
ss DU s s
ur
E E a a u r fsd s u r fsd s
a
θβ
Ω Ω
≥

Π≥ Π⇔ +− + − ≥ 
+   ∫∫
  	 

,( 8 )
within the range for all 0 0 a ≤≤. Only in the limit of  0 a → , when the selling price equals unity, would
issuers be indifferent between both pricing regimes.
Proposition 3 [Discriminatory pricing]. Discriminatory pricing allows issuers to charge uninformed investors a higher
offering price than informed investors to achieve separation. Higher relative payoff of informed investors (regardless of the degree of
uninformed investment demand by Proposition 1) completely eliminates the incentive of misrepresentation. The issuer extracts
most informed investor surplus by keeping the valuation as low as possible within acceptance set  ( ) s Ω .
D. Optimal allocation for maximum issuer payoffs
The ability of issuers to achieve complete allocation within acceptance set  ( ) s Ω  of profitable informed
investment under different pricing regimes indicates the importance of the incidence of investor types in our
issue design problem. However, the residual allocation to uninformed investors and the incentive of informed
investors to participate in DRM at any issue quality – as long as some allocation yields positive payoff –
curtail the ability of informed investors to optimise own payoffs by disclosing their beliefs. So far, we have
not recognised the allocation level as a strategic choice variable of issuers. In the following section we derive
the conditions for maximum expected issuer payoffs in an auction-style issuing process under uniform and
discriminatory pricing, where the issuer’s allocation choice satisfies the acceptance set  ( ) s Ω . In line with the
general notion of a fixed price-quantity schedule in the previous section, we now derive the offering price
from an auction-style allocation choice of informed investors as a continuous function of adjusted beliefs
about the actual issue quality. We also assume multiple informed investors to compare individual investor
payoffs similar to our approach in section C.26
Under discriminatory pricing issuers discount their allocation to informed investors and solve the allocation
choice for optimal (gross) payoffs by offering the residual allocation to uninformed investors at a fair
(market) price. This implies zero net payoffs from uninformed investment while completely denying
informed investors incentives of misrepresenting themselves as uninformed types (with relative benefits of
price discovery increasing in  0 β → ). Since the issue mechanism depends on the participation of informed
investors for an allocation choice within the acceptance set  ( ) s Ω , the issuer chooses to discount the issue for
( ) ( ) s ps u r <  at unit offering price  ( ) ( ) ps qs and acceptable allocation  ( ) ≤ ≤ 01 qs  according to the fixed
price-quantity schedule.38 In extension to the previous section, we model the allocation choice as a continuos
function of investor beliefs about the true issue quality to represent the fixed price-quantity schedule. The
remainder  () s q − 1  is tendered to all uninformed investors at the offering price  ( ) ( ) s ps u r = , so that
()
() ()
()
()
() () () ()
() ()
() () () () () () () () ()
,
,
max 1
max 1 .
s D s ps qs
s s ps qs
ps
E qs u r qs f sd s
qs
ps u r qs f sd s
Ω
Ω

Π= + −  

=+ −
∫
∫
(9)
Under uniform pricing the issuer offers the same selling price to both types of investors at individual allocation
rates of  ( ) qs I  and  () ( ) 1 qs θ −  respectively to maximise expected payoff
                                                
38 The variables  () s p  and  () s q  are used as shorthand to denote the offering price and the allocation to informed
investors. For simplicity we drop the index for the investor type from the notation in the remainder of the chapter, as
the allocation to uninformed investors is not a strategic parameter choice and follows from the price-quantity schedule
of informed investors.27
()
() ()
( )
()
() ( )
()
() () ()
() () ()
( )
()
()
() , , max 1 max
U s s qs ps qs ps
ps ps ps
E qs qs f sd s f sd s
qs qs qs Ω Ω

Π= + − =  
 ∫∫ .39 (10)
We solve the above optimisation problem in (9) and (10) for both pricing regimes by means of a DRM
auction model adapted from Myerson (1981), where the issuer maximises own payoffs over a positive
measure of issue quality through an allocation choice within an acceptance set of profitable informed
investment. Each allocation level of the acceptance set relies on a fixed price-quantity schedule implied by an
auction-style allocation preference as a continuous function of perceived issue quality. This implies an
offering price that satisfies the following participation and incentive constraints:
() () () ()
()
() () () 00 ss I
ps
Us qs u r qsu r ps
qs

≥⇔ − = − ≥ 

(PC)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆ ,, ss qsu r ps qsu r ps ssr −≥ − ∀ (IC1)
() () () ( ) ( )
()
() ( ) ( )
()
()
() () ()
1
1
1,
ss IU
qs ps qs ps
Us Us u r u r
Iq s q s
Iq s I
qs qs
I
θ
θθ
−
≥⇔ − ≥ −
−
⇔≥ ⇔ ≥≥
+
(IC2)
where  () 0 s gr>  is strictly continuous. IC2 applies only to uniform pricing, ensuring that the proposed
allocation-based direct information revelation awards informed investors higher individual net payoff.40 We
                                                
39 Note that if we wanted to represent issuer payoff over the entire range of  [ ] 0,1 r ∈ , we would need to adjust our
maximisation problem by the probability of informed investment to occur (see section IV.B).
40 IC2 implies a higher (lower) allocation to informed investors in response to a higher (lower) number of informed
investors relative to the number of informed investors associated with high (low) uncertainty. For efficient price
discovery under uniform pricing, knowledge about θ  (as a determinant of the allocation schedule) registers as a critical
factor. We know from section III that only the distribution of uninformed types is commonly known. However, if28
consider the allocation choice  ( ) qs a continuous function of investor belief  ( ) ss ∈Ω . From rewriting IC1
and PC above (see Proof Theorem 1) we obtain an alternative definition of non-decreasing and absolutely
continuous  ( ) 0
I Us ≥  with  ( ) ( ) I Us q s ′ =
( ) ( ) ( )
() II s Us Us qsd s
Ω =+ ∫ . (11)
Combining PC and (11) with  ( ) 0
I Us =  (see Lemma) yields the “allocation-based” offering price
() () () ()
() s s ps qsu r qsd s
Ω =− ∫ , (12)
Theorem 1 and 2 follow from substituting (12) in equations (9) and (10) respectively.
Theorem 1 [Discriminatory pricing].  The issuer maximises own payoff under discriminatory pricing by solving
() () ()
() ( ) ()
() max s ss qs ur q s d sfs d s
ΩΩ − ∫∫  for  ( ) ss ∈Ω , where  ( ) ≤ ≤ 01 q s  is non-decreasing.
Proof of Theorem 1. See Appendix.
                                                                                                                                                            
informed investors could estimate θ  valuation uncertainty, issuer payoffs would decrease in the precision of investor
knowledge about θ  as IC2 would become more restrictive. The lack of information about the presence of uninformed
investors adds inefficiency to the maximisation problem of issuers in Theorem 2 (see section IV.D). Chances are that
informed investors would be more inclined to misrepresent themselves under uniform pricing unless they can claim
higher net payoffs as they refine their investment decision. Given a precision measure  Γ ∈ γ  from absolutely continuous
() γ F  with  () 0 > γ f , informed investors might infer the realisation of uninformed investment  , θ θθ  ∈Ψ≡  from
the accuracy of their noisy signal ς . Conditioning  ( ) γ F  on  ( ) 0 > θ γ g  yields the conditional number of uninformed as
() () θ θ θ θ γ γ d g E ∫Ψ
= , with the unconditional number of uninformed investors  () () () ∫ =
π
γ γ γ θ γ θ
2
0
d g f E . In keeping
with MLRP any pair () Γ ∈ ' ,γ γ  with  γ γ > '  the ratio  ( ) ( ) θ θ γ γ g g '  is strictly increasing in θ  for all  Ψ ∈ θ .29
Theorem 2 [Uniform pricing].  The issuer maximises own payoff under uniform pricing by solving
() () () ()
() () () ()
() , max s ss qs ps u r qsd sqs f sd s
ΩΩ − ∫∫  for  ( ) ss ∈Ω , where allocation  ( ) ( ),1 qs I I θ ∈+      is non-decreasing.
Proof of Theorem 2. See Appendix.
The issuer can mitigate underpricing and optimise the proposed issue design at the lowest possible allocation
( ) qs to informed investors within acceptance set  ( ) s Ω . We now derive the optimal range of allocation
choices to maximise issuer payoff, with some underpricing required for profitable participation based on their
private information about actual issue quality.
Corollary 1 [Discriminatory pricing]. Under discriminatory pricing and full allocation the issuer can extract investor
surplus only up to  ()
() () ()
() ( ) ()
() ()
() () max ss D ss s qs E ur q s d sfs d s urfs d sε
ΩΩ Ω Π≡ − ≥ − ∫∫ ∫ , which implies allocation
()
3 6, 1 qs ε ε  ∈  to satisfy informed investment demand according to Lemma at discount ε > 0.
Proof of Corollary 1. See Appendix.
Corollary 2 [Uniform pricing]. Under uniform pricing and full allocation the issuer can extract investor surplus only up
to  ()
() () () ()
() () ( ) ()
() ()
() ()
, max ss U ss s qs ps Eu r q s d s q s f s d s u r f s d s ϕ
ΩΩ Ω Π≡ − ≥ − ∫∫ ∫  s.t.  ( ) ( ) 1 qs I θ θ −≤+ ,
which implies allocation  () ( ) 3 6, 1 qs II ε θ  ∈+   to satisfy informed investment demand according to Lemma at discount to
0 ϕ > .
Proof of Corollary 2. See Appendix.30
Corollary 1 verifies previous findings about higher sustainability of the proposed issue design under price
discrimination, when only little allocation to informed investors suffices to induce price discovery by
informed investors through an allocation preference and overall investor surplus ε  invariant to uninformed
investment demand. Discriminatory pricing allows issuers to extract the most investor surplus from informed
investors, who might otherwise misrepresent themselves as uninformed types if  ( ) ( ) ( ) Us ps p s u r =≤  under
uniform pricing. This case requires a lower (higher) incidence of uninformed investors associated with a higher
(lower) valuation uncertainty to coincide with a higher (lower) allocation to informed investors, so that each
informed investor receives a higher individual payoff than uninformed investors (IC2), given overall investor
surplus  ϕ . Corollary 2 shows that the optimal rule of action of the issuer in the case of uniform pricing
prescribes an allocation choice based primarily on the incidence of types rather than the degree of
underpricing (see also section C).
V. DISCUSSION
In the course of the above analysis we saw that the prospect of informed investors to obtain positive payoffs
from DRM-based disclosure of their private information about the true issue quality via allocation preference
is fundamental to our issue design process. The acceptance set of profitable informed investment qualifies the
optimal allocation schedule for maximum issuer payoffs from endogenous price discovery at varying degrees
of valuation uncertainty and pricing regimes. Issuers maximise their payoffs over a positive measure of issue
quality if the fixed price-quantity schedule implied by an auction-style allocation preference as a continuous
function of perceived issue quality yields profitable informed investment. Moreover, a contractually
predefined repayment level would restrict the acceptance set of perceived issue quality due to lower payoff to
be appropriated by investors. We find that issuers would strictly prefer discriminatory over uniform pricing.
Issuers can extract most surplus from informed investors as “truth tellers” by offering only marginal positive
net payoff (“underpricing”) through a certain allocation choice. The residual allocation to uninformed31
investors and the incentive of informed investors to subscribe to DRM at any issue quality – as long as some
allocation yields positive payoff – curtails the ability of informed investors to optimise own payoffs from
disclosing their beliefs. So uninformed investment demand implicitly strengthens the position of issuers to
maximise their payoffs under any pricing regime. Under uniform pricing, price discovery by informed investors
is only sustainable if both the incidence of investor types and the allocation choice translate into higher
individual profit of each informed investor relative to uninformed investors. Informed investors require
higher underpricing under uniform pricing to obtain higher relative payoffs than uninformed investors in
return for private information disclosure.41 Hence, uniform pricing generates (even) lower expected issuer
payoffs than discriminatory pricing the higher the valuation uncertainty. Issuers would generally prefer a small
(high) allocation to informed (uninformed) investors at low (high) valuation uncertainty to maximise own
payoffs under either pricing regime. Again, the presence of uninformed investors, depending on the degree of
valuation uncertainty contributes to the optimisation of issuer payoffs. The higher the incidence of
uninformed investors, the lower the degree of underpricing due to the profitability constraint of informed
investors under uniform pricing.
If we were to rule out price discrimination as a suitable pricing regime due to statutory provisions in
securitisation markets, further analysis of our issue design model begs the question how the (strategic)
allocation choice conditional on valuation uncertainty changes expected issuer payoffs under uniform pricing.
Our preliminary findings in Corollary 1 and 2 suggest that higher informed investment demand associated with more
valuation uncertainty and higher perceived issue quality always reduces issuer payoffs irrespective of the pricing regime –
though the effect is larger under uniform pricing. We consider a numerical solution to illustrate optimal issuer
payoffs under uniform pricing at varying allocation levels.
                                                
41 This implies a low option value of informed investment from valuation uncertainty and a high precision of adjusted
investor beliefs s  at the limit sr → .32
In Fig. III we approximate net issuer payoff under uniform pricing in a quasi-closed form solution of
Theorem 2, where the allocation choice to informed investors for  () () I Us qs ′ =  (see section IV.D) is a
continuous function of perceived issue quality for all  ( ) ss ∈Ω  (see Lemma in section IV.B). We obtain
conditional investment return  ( ) s ur from repayment  ( ) cr at  ( ) ss ∈Ω  by assuming the precision measure
0 γ →  (i.e. belief s becomes noiseless) to model how investor belief s  translates into a corresponding
realisation  r according to MLRP of  ( ) 0 s Gr>  (see section IV.B). We set the discrete allocation level
commensurate with the incidence of investors in accordance with  ( ) ( ) θ >+ qs I I  of IC2. (see section IV.D)
The cut-off signal is assumed to be  ( ) { } 0.25;0.5;0.75 qs s = =  for simplicity. The issuer retains a reservation
utility in the form of credit enhancement so that constant repayment  ( ) = 0.9 cr . For illustrative purposes we
also show net issuer payoff for full repayment,  ( ) cr r = , at  ( ) 0.25 qs=  and cut-off signal  0.15 s =  (scaled to
conditional expected return  ( ) s ur on the x-axis of Fig. III). As we traverse different degrees of valuation
uncertainty – proxied by the minimum discrete allocation level  ( ) qs according to Theorem 2 (see section
IV.D) – we find that optimal allocation to informed investors as a strategic choice variable to maximise issuer
payoffs is contingent upon the valuation of conditional return  ( ) s ur. Once more informed investors
participate at higher valuation uncertainty – so that only a high allocation  ( ) qs satisfies IC2 – higher valuation
will engender higher issuer payoff. Conversely, we maximise issuer payoff only if lower issue valuation entails
a matching reduction in valuation uncertainty. Fig. III represents optimal issue payoffs as an “efficient
frontier” of deterministic allocation levels for given conditional expected return for all levels of issuer beliefs
about actual issue quality. We derive a positively concave function as solution to the DRM design problem of
issue payoffs if valuation uncertainty is continuous. The curvature is induced by continuous allocation
preference  ( )
() s qsd s
Ω ∫  (see Proof of Theorem 1), which drains issuer profits as higher perceived issue quality
increases informed investment demand in excess of  ( ) qs. This situation follows the basic routine of our
model. If the allocation choice is not commensurate to informed investment demand contingent on perceived33
issue quality, issuers cannot achieve optimal issue payoffs. We also observe that the reservation utility from
partial repayment  ( ) cr limits the acceptance set  ( ) s Ω  of eligible perceived issue quality. Fig. III also shows
the efficiency loss associated with forgone net issue payoffs due to the reservation utility from repayment
( ) cr as the shaded area between the payoff curves at allocation  ( ) 0.25 qs=  for full repayment r and
repayment  ( ) cr respectively.
Both the comparative perspective of both pricing regimes and the graphical representation of issuer payoffs
in Fig. III reveal two main insights into the mechanics of our model under uniform pricing. First, only high
uninformed investment demand associated with low valuation uncertainty allows issuers to satisfy IC2 at low
valuation, while higher valuation uncertainty requires higher valuation for issuer payoff to remain the same.
Second, we find that lower expected repayment facilitates higher valuation at lower (valuation) uncertainty to
generate the same net issuer payoff.
Fig. III. Approximated optimal issuer payoffs under uniform pricing at varying levels of valuation uncertainty.
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VI.  CONCLUSION
Securitisation markets are marred by problems of asymmetric information between market makers with
superior knowledge about securitised asset exposures and uninformed investment demand, where issuers
frequently sound out a fair market price from sophisticated investors before they issue new securities. The
potential effects of this market configuration on price formation, however, have mostly been acknowledged
in the academic and professional literature as agency costs of “winner’s curse”-type underpricing.
In the course of the above analysis, we addressed this issue in a general allocation-based, auction-style issue
design based on price discovery by informed investors. We presented a basic model framework of optimal
security issuance in the spirit of the conventional, allocation-based argument of IPO underpricing due to
asymmetric information between issuers and investors. However, our approach did not reason underpricing
on the grounds of the “winner’s curse” problem. Instead of compensating rationed uninformed investors,
price discounting in our general issue design ensured profitable informed investment over a positive measure
of issue quality to maximise issuer proceeds. We formalised a direct revelation mechanism (DRM) with a fixed price-
quantity schedule, which endogenised price discovery in an auction-style allocation preference as a continuous
function of perceived issue quality. Our thinking was mainly guided by sustainable allocation-based price
discovery, assuming that a monopolistic issuer can only solicit “truth telling” from informed investors if their
allocation choice yields profitable investment. The resultant acceptance set of efficient allocation choices
qualified maximum issuer payoffs at varying degrees of valuation uncertainty and pricing regimes. With
uninformed investment demand clearing the market, we studied how the incidence of uninformed investors
at varying levels of valuation uncertainty affects the utility of informed investment especially under uniform
pricing. Hence, we explored underpricing as jointly determined by profitable allocation by informed investors
and the incidence of uninformed investment demand. We also conditioned profitable informed investment
on some exogenous repayment level to account for structural support mechanisms in securitisation markets.35
We found that – irrespective of the applicable pricing mechanism – the issuer maximises own payoffs at the
lowest possible allocation (within the acceptance set of efficient allocation choices) that still implies profitable
informed investment. Although discriminatory pricing yields higher issuer payoffs, our evidence suggests that
issuers could mitigate forgone net payoffs under uniform pricing by maintaining low valuation uncertainty at
moderate levels of issue quality to induce a high presence of uninformed investors. Uninformed investment
demand implicitly strengthens the position of issuers to maximise own payoffs, mainly because it lowers the
degree of underpricing needed to satisfy the profitability constraint of informed investors. Under uniform
pricing, the issuer needs to ensure that the composition of the investor pool allows informed investors to
appropriate higher individual profit (than uninformed types). Otherwise, they might be inclined to request no
allocation at all (i.e. misrepresent themselves as uninformed investors) due to insufficient profitability from
price discovery in DRM. Any reservation utility from partial repayment carried an efficiency loss and required
a higher issue valuation. The degree of valuation uncertainty critically mattered only under uniform pricing,
where an altered incidence of investor types required an adjustment of the allocation choice to still guarantee
profitable informed investment at the highest possible level of issuer payoffs. Since a higher (lower) allocation
to informed investors at higher (lower) valuation uncertainty and a lower (higher) incidence of uninformed
investors implies higher (lower) underpricing, we would expect the minimisation of valuation uncertainty to
be the dominant strategy for each level of valuation at the margin (cf. second moment of payoff curve in Fig.
III). The issuer maximised payoffs under uniform pricing by following an “efficient frontier” of allocation
choices across all states of issue quality, where the amount of implied investment induced information
disclosure by informed investors as a continuous function of perceived issue valuation. Nonetheless,
informed investors never receive an allocation that maximises their own payoffs from investment unless high
valuation uncertainty rules out any uninformed investment demand.
Overall this chapter represents a first attempt to reason underpricing on the grounds of a strategic allocation
choice by issuers to maximise own payoffs by engaging informed investors in profitable price discovery of
actual issue quality. The coincidence of valuation uncertainty and the allocation choice for a certain level of36
perceived issue quality seems to be a prime consideration for optimal issuer payoffs under asymmetric
information. While our approach might be overly parsimonious in many respects, we have restricted our issue
design to include the reservation utility from a pre-defined level of repayment as the only element pertinent to
securitisation markets. Hence, the general tenor of our model invites a more specialised adaptation of our
findings to different asset types and entertains the need for more refined modelling of intricate security design
features of asset-backed securities, such as the impact of option clauses, loss subordination and payment
structures. Also the possible relaxation of several exogenous assumptions in our model design, such as the
repayment level and uniform informed investment, warrants further theoretical investigation.37
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VIII. APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of equation (7).
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q.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 1. In keeping with the standard logic of the optimal auction model by Myerson (1981) we
can re-write IC and PC in section IV.D in order to substitute the pricing component of the optimisation
problem as an allocation-based profitability constraint. We re-write (IC1) in terms of  ˆ s  and  ˆ r  as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0, , , ss I Us qsu r ps qsu r ps ssrr ≥⇔ − ≥ − ∀ .( I C 1’)
Combining IC1’ with IC1 for  ( ) ( ) ˆ 0
II Us Us −≥  yields41
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which implies  () () I Us qs ′ =  for  ( ) ( ) ˆ ss ur ur →  with continuous  ( ) qs. Hence, we can derive
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Ω =+ ∫ , where the assessment of cut-off signal s  yields zero payoff of informed
investors set. Combining IC1 and PC to
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yields the allocation-based offering price
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where  ( ) 0
I Us =  as optimal mechanism for non-decreasing and absolutely continuous  ( ) 0
I Us ≥ .
Substituting equation (16) into the optimisation problem in (9) yields
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q.e.d.42
Proof of Theorem 2. Analogous to the Proof of Theorem 1, the optimal price-quantity schedule under
uniform pricing hinges only on the continuous allocation  ( ) qs to informed investors for  ( ) 0
I Us ≥ . We
substitute  () () () ()
() s s ps qsu r qsd s
Ω =− ∫  into the optimisation problem and obtain
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s.t. IC2 to prevent informed investors from misrepresenting their type.
q.e.d.
Proof of Corollary 1. Since  () () I Us qs ′ =  for  ( ) ( ) ˆ ss ur ur →  (see Proof of Theorem 1) of profitability
constraint  ( ) 0
I Us ≥  for  ( ) ss ∈Ω , let us assume that some investor surplus ε > 0 (which implies
() () ss ur ur >  for profitable informed investment in Lemma) as upper bound of “underpricing” involves
allocation  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ss qs Aur ur εε =−  (with  ]] 0,1 Aε ∈ ) so that the issuer appropriates payoff
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discriminatory pricing (see Theorem 1). Issuers minimise the amount of underpricing
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which yields  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
3 6 ss Aur ur qs εε ε −= =  as the optimal allocation schedule for investor surplus ε > 0
with issuer payoff  () ( )( )
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s D s
Eu r f s d s ε
Ω
Π= − ∫  under discriminatory pricing and full allocation.
q.e.d.
Proof of Corollary 2. Analogous to the Proof of Corollary 1 we assume that for all  ( ) ss ∈Ω  informed
investor surplus  0 ϕ >  is associated with allocation  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ss qs Aur ur ϕϕ =−  (with  ]] 0,1 Aϕ ∈ ), which
entails issuer payoff  () ( ) ( )
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uniform pricing (see Theorem 2), where issuers minimise the amount of “underpricing”
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Rewriting L.H.S. of (20) with IC2 generates inequality
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Combining both equations above generates inequality44
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which yields  () () () () ( ) 3 6 ss Aur ur qs II ϕϕ θ −= = +  as the optimal allocation schedule for investor
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q.e.d.